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When a plaintiff seeks to send notification of his Fair Labor Standards 
Act claim to a collective class of potential plaintiffs, the district court 
must authorize which recipients may receive this notice. Ordinarily, 
the court determines that employees of the same position or under the 
same employer receive collective action notice, but may a district 
court authorize mailing of notice to employees proven to have signed 
mandatory arbitration agreements? In Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that if a defendant-employer 
proves that specific employees have entered mandatory arbitration 
agreements, they may not receive FLSA court notice in a collective 
action claim. Moreover, the court must afford all parties the 
opportunity to prove or disprove the existence and validity of these 
agreements through the Seventh Circuit’s new framework mandating 
an initial stage of discovery. Previously, the Seventh Circuit lacked 
any formalized framework to make this determination, leaving 
complete discretion over the formation of collective actions to district 
courts. Without guidance, many district courts adopted a two-step 
certification process that admitted a wider group into a collective 
action before excluding specific opt-in plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit 
1
Martinez: Facebook Message Not Delivered: Employers May Challenge Authoriza
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 16                                          Fall 2020 
 
2 
joins the Fifth Circuit in addressing the issue of whether employees 
are bound by mandatory arbitration agreements at this earlier point in 
litigation. This decision, however, understated how this new 
framework aligns district courts with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling and the goals of the Federal 
Arbitration Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. This article 
discusses how the district courts’ role in determining the scope of 
FLSA collective actions mandates this result in Bigger v. Facebook, 
Inc. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bigger v. Facebook, Inc. 
provides guidance to district courts’ management over Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”) claims in the instances where putative 
plaintiffs are employees bound by mandatory arbitration clauses with 
their employer.1 Parties like employees and employers can elect to 
enter contracts which mandate arbitration, foregoing claims in a 
traditional court setting and consenting to submit all disputes before a 
neutral third-party arbitrator.2 There are several advantages to this 
route, among them cheaper and speedier resolution of disputes,3 yet 
arbitration agreements remain opposed by consumer and employee 
advocates. Congress lessened historical opposition to arbitration 
clauses by passing the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”),4 
 
1 Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., 947 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir. 2020). 
2 See JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
R44960, MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (2017). 
3 On top of lower costs relative to litigation, arbitration often offers greater 
efficiency, speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized 
disputes. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010); 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011) (“[T]he informality 
of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed 
of dispute resolution.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) 
(“Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that 
may be of particular importance in employment litigation.”). 
4 Arbitration infringed on the number of cases that English judges resolved, 
thereby interfering with their fees-based salary. In current day, it is estimated that a 
quarter of all nonunion employees are subject to mandatory arbitration agreements. 
SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44960, at 1-2. 
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providing that arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable.”5 The Supreme Court further affirmed a “liberal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements” as a way to respect the contractual 
arrangement of the parties, even when balanced against statutory 
protections in employment claims.6 In the context of this policy in 
favor of arbitration agreements, the Seventh Circuit addressed a 
question of first impression: whether a district court may authorize 
court notice of an FLSA collective action to putative plaintiffs when 
its recipients have entered into mutual arbitration agreements.7 The 
Seventh Circuit held that despite the FLSA’s broad remedial purposes, 
a district court may not send court notice to specific individuals if the 
court has been shown that those employees are bound to arbitrate their 
claims.8 Furthermore, Judge Michael S. Kanne, writing the unanimous 
opinion for the Seventh Circuit,9 joined the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals10 in implementing a framework for district courts to permit 
discovery on the validity of these arbitration agreements before 
certifying a collective action.11 Addressing this matter at an earlier 
stage of litigation will impact plaintiffs’ ability to reach a wider 
number of employees to join the suit, but this is necessary to maintain 
judicial neutrality in the court’s managerial powers over FLSA 
collective actions claims. 
This article will discuss why the Seventh Circuit correctly held 
that district courts should not issue notice of an FLSA collective action 
 
5 9 U.S.C. § 2.  
6 Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 109 (holding that the FAA applies in 
employment contracts and that the exemption clause should be applied narrowly to 
certain classes of employment like seamen, railroad workers, and other workers 
involved in foreign or interstate commerce); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 
1612, 1621 (2018) (holding that neither the Federal Arbitration Act’s savings clause 
nor the National Labor Relations Act’s Section 7 protections of “concerted 
activities” superseded the Court’s enforcement of arbitration agreements). 
7 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1047. 
8 Id. at 1050. 
9 Joined by Chief Judge Diane Wood and Judge (now Justice) Amy C. Barret. 
10 In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494, 502-03 (5th Cir. 2019). 
11 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050. 
3
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to individuals subject to mandatory arbitration. This holding clarifies 
the parameters district court must adhere to in issuing court notice to 
“potential plaintiffs,” that is, employees that are “potential 
participants” in the FLSA claim.12 Moreover, the court’s framework 
for determining whether individual employees are subject to valid 
arbitration agreements offers guidance to district courts to make a 
proper determination over which employees receive court notice while 
maintaining the ultimate discretion with the district courts. This article 
identifies two main purposes fulfilled by this holding and new 
framework. First, the Seventh Circuit’s decision reasserts the role of 
the district court as a case manager of the admission of additional 
parties with a duty to only authorize “accurate and timely notice” of 
FLSA claims. Second, addressing this threshold question before 
certification of a collective group strikes a balance between the goals 
of the FAA and the FLSA. 
 
FACTS OF THE CASE: SUSIE BIGGER’S FLSA CLAIM AND MOTION TO 
SEND COLLECTIVE ACTION NOTICE TO ALL FACEBOOK CSM LEVELS 3 
AND 4 EMPLOYEES 
 
The facts at issue are straightforward relative to the larger 
procedural questions that arose before the Seventh Circuit. Susie 
Bigger, a Facebook, Inc. employee in Chicago, IL, worked as a Client 
Solutions Manager (“CSM”) on a sales team helping clients navigate 
their purchasing options for online advertisements. The role combined 
two main functions: “analytical work” to make advertising 
recommendations and “upselling” clients to increase sales.13 Facebook 
subdivided the CSM role into various levels depending on experience, 
deeming levels 1 and 2 eligible for overtime pay while CSMs levels 3 
and higher were deemed overtime-exempt.14 Bigger, a CSM level 4 
employee, worked more than 40 hours weekly and brought suit in 
2017 against Facebook claiming that her employer misclassified her as 
 
12 In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d at 502. 
13 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1047. 
14 Id. 
4
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overtime-exempt.15 Bigger alleged that Facebook’s actions violated the 
FLSA and sued on behalf of all similarly situated employees, CSMs 
level 3 or higher, to recover lost overtime wages.16 
Bigger began her claim as the singular plaintiff. She then moved 
to conditionally certify both a class and collective action, however, the 
district court primarily discussed certification and notice of the latter.17 
Both collective actions and class actions facilitate the resolution of 
claims brought by multiple plaintiffs against the same defendant. In 
the FLSA context, this permits multiple plaintiffs to proceed under the 
same case to enforce their claims for unpaid wages due to a violation 
of minimum wage or overtime compensation. Whereas class actions 
are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, however, 
collective action is authorized by the FLSA statute.18 The FLSA’s brief 
statutory language providing plaintiffs the ability to proceed under 
collective action has allowed district courts wide discretion in 
managing claims, including judgment over the mailing of court notice 
and the admittance of plaintiffs.19 Collective action further differs 
from class actions in that members of a collective must opt-in to the 
certified group rather than opt-out of a certified class action.20 For this 
reason, court notice to potential plaintiffs is particularly important to 




17 Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (the 
proposed collective would have included “[a]ll individuals who were employed by 
Facebook as Client Solutions Managers at level IC-3 or IC-4 at any location in the 
United States during the period from three years” before conditional certification.) 
18 29 U.S.C. § 216 (FLSA provides that “an action to recover the liability 
prescribed in the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer … by 
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated.”). 
19 Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170-171 (1989). 
20 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1046, n.1; see also Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 
705 F.3d 770, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]n a collective action the members of the 
class (of the “collective”) must opt into the suit to be bound by the judgment or 
settlement in it, while in a class action governed by Rule 23(b)(3) (a class action 
seeking damages) they must opt out not to be bound.”) (emphasis in original). 
5
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Seeking to cast a wide net to Facebook employees and garner 
interest for individuals to opt-in to her FLSA claim, Bigger argued that 
the district court should authorize court notice to all CSMs levels 3 
and higher. Facebook opposed Bigger’s proposed collective and 
argued against the district court permitting a court notice to be sent to 
all CSMs levels 3 and higher. Facebook argued that because most of 
the intended recipients agreed to individually arbitrate their legal 
disputes and waived their legal right to seek redress in court, they were 
not potential plaintiffs eligible to join Bigger’s claim.21  
Despite Facebook’s arguments, the district court agreed with 
Bigger to conditionally certify her proposed collective action. The 
Seventh Circuit lacked an official standard for determining how 
district courts should proceed when a plaintiff moves to certify a 
collective. Most district courts, therefore, adopted a two-step test 
utilized by other Court of Appeals, as was the case here.22 In the first 
step, “conditional certification,” the plaintiff proceeding in an FLSA 
claim had a low burden of proof in arguing that she and similarly 
situated employees were “victims of a common policy” in violation of 
the law.23 The district court then facilitated mailing of court notice and 
admission of interested plaintiffs. Following completion of discovery 
on all substantive issues, the district court applied a stricter standard 
and reevaluated whether the named plaintiff and opt-in plaintiffs were 
indeed similarly situated to proceed as a collective to trial. 24 
The district court noted the tension between the liberal 
enforcement of arbitration clauses under the FAA and the plaintiff’s 
requirement to allege a “modest factual showing” in an FLSA 
collective action claim.25 However, operating under this two-step 
certification process, it ruled that the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements between Facebook and third parties was premature and 
 
21 Bigger, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1021-22. 
22 Id. at 1021. 
23 See William B. Rubenstein, 7 Newberg on Class Actions § 23:37 (5th ed. 
2020). 
24 Id.; see also Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1049, n.5. 
25 Bigger, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1022. 
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conditionally certified Bigger’s collective because she had met her 
burden that the putative plaintiffs were all victims of a common 
policy.26 The district court effectively decided to permit notice to a 
larger group of potential plaintiffs, allow a broad group to enter the 
claim and determine which plaintiffs were indeed similarly situated at 
the second stage. Opposing this wait-and-see approach, Facebook 
sought and was granted interlocutory appeal of the district court’s 
certification. 
 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT HELD THAT DISTRICT COURTS MAY NOT AUTHORIZE 
FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES BOUND BY 
ARBITRATION AND EMPLOYERS MUST BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO 
PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT FOR 
SPECIFIC EMPLOYEES. 
 
On appeal, Facebook argued that most employees would have 
improperly received notice of Bigger’s FLSA claim because they 
waived their right to join class and collective actions.27 Instead, these 
employees agreed to arbitrate their claims, but, Bigger was not bound 
by a similar arbitration agreement, thereby distinguishing Bigger 
because she could proceed in a suit before the district court.28 
According to Facebook, the notice would misinform a majority of its 
recipients about their ability to join Bigger’s FLSA claim while 
simultaneously inflating Bigger’s leverage in settlement power.29 In 
contrast, Bigger overlooked the matter of arbitration and focused on 
the substantive questions that united her with the larger proposed 
collective because they were “victims of a common policy” that 
misclassified CSMs as overtime-exempt employees in violation of the 
FLSA.30 According to Bigger, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by authorizing notice to a larger group of putative plaintiffs 
 
26 Id. at 1022-24. 
27 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1048. 
28 Id. at 1048-49. 
29 Id. at 1049. 
30 Id. 
7
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because the court could admit these employees as plaintiffs and then 
remove them if the defendant motioned to decertify the class or 
compel arbitration.31 Bigger argued that the district court correctly 
relied on the two-step certification process and that its discretion in 
managing its docket of cases permitted the broad authorization of 
court notice, regardless of the putative employees’ arbitration 
obligations. 
The Seventh Circuit arrived at its decision by weighing the twin 
goals of the FLSA, enforcement and efficiency, against its dangers. It 
first noted that the FLSA permits collective action as a means of 
practically enforcing the rights of plaintiffs by permitting employees 
to pool resources when seeking redress would be otherwise deterred 
by the costs of legal representation.32 The Seventh Circuit then 
explained that the practice of sending notice to a larger group of 
putative plaintiffs and then weeding out ineligible participants might 
generally favor the efficient resolution of a greater number of claims.33 
In this specific situation, however, the court would have delayed 
litigation by providing individuals subject to mandatory arbitration 
agreements the futile opportunity to join the collective action. 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit weighed these goals against the 
court’s obligations to maintain judicial neutrality. By granting 
authorization of collective action notice to a larger group of putative 
plaintiffs, the district court approached an implicit endorsement of 
Bigger’s claim in the eyes of the putative plaintiffs. The decision also 
recognized one of Facebook’s arguments that broad distribution of 
collective action notice would artificially inflate the plaintiff’s 
settlement leverage.34 
Taking all these values into consideration, the Seventh Circuit 
held that a “court may not authorize notice to individuals whom the 




33 Id. at 1050. 
34 Id; see also Brief and Short Appendix of Appellant, at 16-17, Bigger v. 
Facebook, Inc., 947 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1944). 
8
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their right to join the action.”35 Moreover, the defendant must be 
offered an opportunity to prove the existence of such arbitration 
agreements. The prior two-step certification process did not afford 
defendant-employers the opportunity to contest mailing of court notice 
to specific employees while simultaneously holding plaintiffs to a low 
burden at the conditional certification stage. Therefore, the Seventh 
Circuit issued a new framework for district courts managing FLSA 
claims to determine whether the defendant-employer can exclude 
specific employees from receiving court notice.36 First, the court must 
determine whether the plaintiff contests the existence of valid 
arbitration agreements entered into by members of the proposed 
collective.37 In most cases, plaintiffs will contest the validity of these 
arbitration agreements.38 “[I]f a plaintiff contests the defendant’s 
assertions, then – before authorizing notice to the alleged “arbitration 
employees” – the court must permit the parties to submit additional 
evidence on the agreements’ existence and validity.”39 Following 
discovery, the court may determine whether the employer has met its 
burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence 
of a valid arbitration agreement for each employee it seeks to exclude 
from receiving notice.40 The court may then authorize notice to any 
employee not bound by a mutual arbitration agreement.41 
The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the courts do not take the 
employer’s word at face value.42 In the instant case, for example, 
Facebook originally introduced templates of the mutual arbitration 





38 This was not the case in JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 
2019). 
39 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (“[I]f the employer does not prove that an employee entered a valid 
arbitration agreement, then the court may authorize notice to that employee—
granted, of course, that the employee is otherwise an appropriate notice recipient.”). 
42 Id. at 1051. 
9
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allegedly entered into.43 This sample agreement would not suffice to 
prove the validity and existence of an arbitration agreement binding 
individual employees because the employer carries the burden to 
prove which specific employees are bound by its terms.44 Moreover, 
the Seventh Circuit emphasized that judges are authorized to resolve 
the threshold question of whether the parties are bound by a valid 
arbitration agreement without interfering with the general policy 
favoring arbitration in the FAA.45 
 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S NEW FRAMEWORK ENSURES THAT DISTRICT 
COURTS STILL HAVE DISCRETION OVER FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
WHILE ENSURING ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION 
 
The Seventh Circuit correctly ruled that district courts cannot 
authorize court notice of collective action claims to individuals bound 
by arbitration agreements. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s 
framework provides an opportunity for defendant-employers to contest 
mailing of opt-in notices to arbitration-bound employees before 
certifying the collective. In effect, district court judges maintain their 
discretion over the admission of similarly situated individuals, 
however, the Seventh Circuit’s new procedure ensures that only 
plaintiffs that can opt into the suit receive notice. By resolving this 
threshold question at the beginning of litigation, the Bigger framework 
fulfills two purposes. First, the Seventh Circuit’s decision reaffirms 
that the district court judge must be involved early in litigation to 
provide putative plaintiffs accurate and timely notice of the FLSA 
claim. Second, addressing the threshold question of the existence and 
validity of arbitration agreements at an earlier stage of litigation strikes 
a balance between the goals of the FAA and the FLSA. 
 
 
43 Id. at 1048. 
44 Id. at 1051 (The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court with 
instructions to apply the new framework and allow additional discovery on the 
specific employees bound by arbitration agreements before Facebook could exclude 
specific employees from receiving court notice.) 
45 Id. 
10
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Under the Seventh Circuit’s New Framework, District Courts Become 
Involved Early to Resolve the Scope of Court Notice in FLSA 
Collective Action 
 
First, the Seventh Circuit’s new framework aligns the district 
courts’ procedure for authorizing court notice in FLSA claims with the 
Supreme Court’s holding that district courts only provide “accurate 
and timely” notice to putative plaintiffs in collective actions.46 In 
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, the Supreme Court held that the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s (“ADEA”) authorization of 
collective action grants the district court the necessary managerial 
authority to oversee the joining of multiple parties.47 The Court 
justified the district court’s involvement in collective action litigation 
to curtail against the potential abuse of the multiple-party device, 
much like how a district court judge oversees the contours of a class 
action claim under F.R.C.P. Rule 23.48 This broad authority, however, 
must only be exercised in a manner that ensures efficient resolution of 
claims and accurate information to parties entering the suit.49 Since the 
ADEA incorporates its collective action authorization from the FLSA 
statute,50 these duties apply in equal force to collective action claims 
arising from a plaintiff’s allegations under the FLSA. The Seventh 
Circuit’s holding in Bigger clarifies one way in which district courts 
should guard against potential abuse of the collective action devise by 
ensuring that recipients of court notices receive accurate information 
about their eligibility to join an FLSA claim.  
 
46 Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 170 (holding that the district court 
judge must be involved at an early period in ADEA collective actions claims to 
ensure that any communication sent to potential plaintiffs accurately informs 
potential plaintiffs of the claim before the court). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 170-71. 
49 Id. 
50 Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(Class actions under the ADEA are authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), which 
expressly borrows the opt-in class action mechanism of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994)). 
11
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Under the prior two-step certification process, district courts did 
not scrutinize the scope of a collective or which employees received 
official court notice of a plaintiff’s FLSA claim.51 Rather, district 
courts approved most plaintiffs’ proposed collectives so long as the 
plaintiff met the low burden of alleging that employees were victims 
of a similar policy.52 The district courts’ broad authorization, however, 
incorrectly granted plaintiffs permission to act like the sower in the 
biblical parable, who scattered his seed widely hoping that it will fall 
on good soil.53 This was the approach adopted by Bigger on appeal. 
Bigger emphasized that the first step of conditional certification only 
required the plaintiff to demonstrate a “modest factual showing” and 
that the court should not decide the matter of whether employees 
signed a mandatory arbitration agreement at that point in litigation.54 
Bigger then went beyond this lenient standard and argued that the 
district court does not “decide substantive issues or require conclusive 
support of plaintiffs’ claims.”55 Courts, however, should check 
plaintiffs like Bigger seeking to send court notice to employees that 
are likely restricted by mandatory arbitration agreements to prevent 
plaintiffs from throwing everything at the wall to see what sticks. Even 
if employees and proposed recipients of court notice might share 
substantive facts that prove or disprove the alleged FLSA violation, 
not all employees may seek relief in federal court.56 If the district court 
 
51 FLSA’s collective action provision does not define “potential plaintiffs,” nor 
does it provide for a specific methodology of determining which recipients may 
receive court notice to opt-in to FLSA claims. For these reasons, many courts, 
including several district courts within the Seventh Circuit, have coalesced around 
this two-step process. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 7 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 23:37 (5th ed. 2020). 
52 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1049, n.5. 
53 Matthew 13:1-23. 
54 Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief at 16-17, Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., 947 F.3d 1043 
(7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1944).  
55 Id. at 17. 
56 Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 605 F.3d 445, 449, n.1 (7th Cir. 2010) (“There 
may also be cases where despite common questions as to liability, the remedy is so 
tailored to each particular plaintiff that a collective action is inappropriate.”). 
12
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adopted a lenient standard in every instance of certifying a collective, 
it would defer its careful exercise of managerial responsibility to the 
plaintiff. Moreover, the court would compromise its role in providing 
accurate information to putative plaintiffs because individuals with 
valid arbitration agreements may be misled into believing they may 
join the plaintiff’s claim. Since the court notice bears the weight and 
name of the district court, an individual receiving it might confuse it 
with the court’s solicitation for claims rather than the named 
plaintiff’s.57 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s new framework reasserts the 
district court’s active role in shaping the contours of a collective 
action, in part by mandating a scrupulous analysis of which recipients 
should be notified of the pending suit. The Seventh Circuit effectively 
defined which recipients are “potential employees” eligible to receive 
opt-in notice, or at the very least, excluded those bound by arbitration 
agreements from its definition. District courts have always made this 
determination at the second stage of the two-step process by enforcing 
defendants’ motions to decertify a class or to exclude plaintiffs.58 The 
framework set forth in Bigger, therefore, does not detract from the 
managerial authority district courts already exercised over FLSA 
collective actions. Rather, it guides district courts through a stage of 
discovery to determine the proper scope of its court notice that a 
plaintiff may utilize to reach potential plaintiffs, that is, those 
employees that may join the claim.  
Adhering to this preliminary step supports the district courts’ duty 
to ensure that any official court communication be timely, accurate, 
 
57 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1049. 
58 Mickles on behalf of herself v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1276 
(11th Cir. 2018) (“The second stage is precipitated by a motion for decertification 
from the defendant, which is typically filed after discovery is complete and the 
matter is ready for trial. At this stage, the court has more information and makes a 
factual determination of the similarly-situated question. If the claimants are similarly 
situated, the district court allows the representative action to proceed to trial. If they 
are not similarly situated, the district court decertifies the class, and the opt-in 
plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice.) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted).  
13
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and informative. Since the employer-defendant holds relevant 
information on its own obligations to uphold arbitration agreements, 
district courts can expediently enforce arbitration by placing the 
burden on the defendant-employer to produce proof of the existence 
and validity of each agreement. 59 Doing so increases the likelihood 
that the court reaches an accurate audience and reduces the harm of an 
artificially inflated collective group. Alternative methods may 
accomplish some, but not all, of these goals. For example, adding a 
disclaimer to the court notice to the effect of “Individual employees 
bound to an arbitration agreement may not be eligible to join” may 
increase the accuracy of a court’s notification to potential plaintiffs, 
but it overlooks the efficiency of placing the burden on the defendant-
employer to provide evidence of specific arbitration agreements at the 
onset of litigation. District courts still hold discretion in managing 
their docket and defining the scope of the collective, but this 
framework provides procedures to guard against the risks associated 
with an unchecked collective group that the prior certification process 
permitted. 
 
Providing the Parties the Opportunity to Prove or Disprove the 
Existence of Arbitration Agreements Balances the Competing Goals of 
the FAA and FLSA. 
 
Second, the Seventh Circuit’s new framework fulfills the 
secondary purpose of balancing the goals of two broadly interpreted 
statutes, the FAA and the FLSA. The new procedure guides district 
court judges in respecting the contractual agreements that arbitration-
bound employees have agreed to while addressing the remedial 
concerns of plaintiffs bringing claims under the FLSA. 
Congress pronounced a strong favoritism for implementing 
mandatory arbitration agreements when it codified that courts should 
enforce parties’ agreed-to arbitration terms as “valid, irrevocable, and 
 
59 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050 (“The employer seeking to exclude employees 
from receiving notice has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
the existence of a valid arbitration agreement for each employee it seeks to exclude 
from receiving notice.”). 
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enforceable.”60 In the employment context, the Supreme Court 
furthered this broad policy of the FAA by affirmatively declaring 
mandatory arbitration clauses enforceable in employment contracts.61 
Even statutory language like the FAA’s savings clause, which permits 
arbitration agreements to be declared invalid because of common law 
contract defenses, has been limited by the Court to apply only to 
generally applicable defenses and not on the individual merits of a 
particular agreement.62 District courts may require parties to prove the 
existence and validity of arbitration agreements with specific 
information as to which parties are bound, the specific terms in the 
agreement, and generally resolving the gateway question of whether 
an agreement is valid. 63 Courts, however, must resolve any doubts 
concerning the scope of these contractual agreements in favor of 
arbitration.64  
Bigger appropriately raised her concerns that Facebook had not 
sufficiently proved the existence of its arbitration agreements with 
CSMs levels 3 and higher before the district court. At the time of this 
appeal, Facebook had only submitted into evidence two templates of 
arbitration agreements that “336 of the 428 CSMs employed at IC 3 
and 4” entered into and were allegedly prevented them from joining 
 
60 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
61 Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 119 (narrowly constructing the FAA’s 
exemption clause in §1, prohibiting the use of arbitration clauses only in 
employment contracts of transportation workers, but affirming that arbitration 
clauses may be enforced generally in other employment contracts). 
62 AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 339-43 (FAA preempts any state law or 
rule that outright prohibits the enforcement of arbitration clauses, and, moreover, the 
FAA’s savings clause does not preserve said state laws, or in this case, California 
judicial rule prohibiting arbitration clauses in instances of duress, because the state 
court inherently makes a substantive determination of the merits of the arbitration 
agreement). 
63 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050-51 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); see also Lamps Plus, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1416 
(affirming a default assumption that district courts resolve “gateway” questions as to 
the validity of arbitration agreements). 
64 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1051. 
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Bigger’s claim.65 As Chief Judge Wood pointed out in oral argument, 
however, these templates failed to demonstrate which specific 
individuals were bound to its terms and whether the agreements varied 
in scope for particular employees.66 On this basis, Bigger argued for 
delaying the determination of the validity of these proposed arbitration 
agreements until after conditional certification and mailing of court 
notice. This lines up with the approach of the prior two-step 
certification process because the burden was placed solely on the 
plaintiff-employee to allege a relationship to the putative plaintiffs. 
From this perspective, notice by itself does not go against the validity 
of mandatory arbitration agreements because employees do not violate 
the terms of their contractual obligations with Facebook until they 
decide to opt into Bigger’s claim. But this procedure fails to account 
for the other half of the arbitration agreement, namely, offering 
Facebook an opportunity to enforce its contractual rights under the 
FAA.67 
Permitting the defendant-employer an opportunity to enforce the 
arbitration clauses it has signed aligns the district court with the 
federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements. By 
shifting the burden onto defendant-employers, the district court 
maximizes the efficiency of resolving jurisdictional questions of 
whether certain plaintiffs can proceed in federal court by having one 
party to the signed agreements responsible for asserting the contractual 
right. Furthermore, this change asserts the district court’s gatekeeping 
authority to resolve matters of the existence and validity of arbitration 
agreements under the FAA.68 Within the larger scope of a district 
court’s managerial responsibility for defining collective action claims, 
the Seventh Circuit’s new framework provides the procedural steps a 
 
65 Id. at 1048, n.3. 
66 Oral Argument at 6:20, Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., 947 F.3d 1043 (2020) (No. 
19-1944), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2019/pr.19-1944.19-
1944_09_27_2019.mp3. 
67 MARTIN DOMKE, GABRIEL WILNER & LARRY E. EDMONSON, 1 DOMKE ON 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 21:1 (2020) (The party to the arbitration agreement 
holds the contractual right to compel arbitration.). 
68 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003). 
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district court must follow to resolve substantive matters of which 
plaintiffs are indeed similarly situated to proceed at the district court 
level, and which plaintiffs must arbitrate their claims. 69 
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit had to balance enforcement of the 
FLSA and its remedial purposes to redress employee claims of wage 
and hour violations.70 The opinion took stock of the statute’s two 
goals, efficiency and enforcement, in arriving to its conclusion.71 The 
Seventh Circuit determined the court’s commitment to judicial 
neutrality ultimately outweighed the benefits that derived from the 
FLSA’s goals, but this conclusion understated how the new framework 
enhances the purposes of the FLSA. While the Seventh Circuit arrived 
at the correct conclusion that employees proven to be bound by 
arbitration cannot receive notice of the FLSA collective action claim, 
the decision did not expand on the legal distinctions between Bigger 
and the CSMs that signed arbitration agreements. Their function and 
role within the corporation share similar substantive questions, 
however, their rights to seek a legal claim differed widely.  
The goal of efficiency under the FLSA statute commits the district 
court to resolving in a single action issues arising from the same 
alleged violation.72 As stated above, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that this goal neither favored nor disfavored authorizing a larger scope 
of court notice, but it offered some reasons for both. The Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that casting a wider net of putative plaintiffs only to 
later remove ineligible arbitration-bound employees could efficiently 
 
69 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (Courts 
should apply state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts when 
deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes.). 
70 Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(the Supreme Court has interpreted the [FLSA] liberally and afforded its protections 
broad coverage). 
71 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1049. 
72 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“An action to recover … may be maintained against 
any employer … by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or 
themselves and other employees similarly situated.”); see also Hoffmann-La Roche 
Inc., 493 U.S. at 170 (“The judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one 
proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged 
discriminatory activity.”). 
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resolve a higher number of disputes.73 On the other hand, in the 
specific situation where the defendant has demonstrated that certain 
individuals cannot join the FLSA collective action, it would be 
inefficient to send notice to them.74 Between the two alternatives, 
however, the district court follows a speedier resolution of claims 
when it separates individual employees that have no opportunity to 
enter the claim. If court notice of an FLSA collective action were to be 
sent widely to individuals bound to arbitration, some partial amount of 
this group may be misled into seeking relief by opting into the claim 
rather than initiating their own arbitration claim. Under the prior two-
step process, the admittance of these arbitration-bound employees 
would be unchecked until the second stage of the certification process. 
Facebook, the defendant-employer contesting the admittance of certain 
employees, would have to stagger its motions to compel arbitration for 
each employee that mistakenly opted into the claim; in turn, the 
district court would have to rule on each individual motion. This delay 
runs counter to the district courts’ duty to administer proceedings in a 
way to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.”75 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit’s framework saves the 
parties’ and the court’s efforts because it condenses multiple motions 
to compel arbitration into one step. By resolving the matter of 
determining which employees were bound by arbitration earlier in 
litigation, district courts can more efficiently resolve the substantive 
matters of whether FLSA plaintiffs can proceed under the same claim. 
The second FLSA goal, enforcement, directs the district court to 
authorize multiple-plaintiff suits so that employees may pool resources 
when seeking to redress violations of overtime-pay requirements. 
Specifically, the FLSA statutory language permits collective action of 
 
73 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050 (“[I]t may be efficient to first send notice to a 
group of people and then weed out those who opt in but are in fact ineligible to 
join.”). 
74 Id. (“[T]he notice may serve only to prompt futile attempts at joinder or the 
assertion of claims outside the collective proceeding.”). 
75 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 (“A judge may regulate practice 
in any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 
and 2075, and the district's local rules.”). 
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“similarly situated” employees to join a claim against their employer.76 
The FLSA’s remedial goals might lend support for a broader 
interpretation of which employees are “similarly situated,” but the 
district court must respect the outer limits of its discretion. The 
Seventh Circuit’s holding and framework clarifies these boundaries by 
guiding district courts to only authorize notice to putative plaintiffs 
that still hold the legal right to enter the claim and uphold judicial 
neutrality in its decision. 
The key difference distinguishing Bigger and CSMs levels 3 and 
4 that are bound by arbitration clauses is that only Bigger held the 
legal right to proceed in her FLSA claim before the federal district 
court. If an employee is proven to have consented to arbitrate claims 
outside of court in their employment contract, and he opts into 
Bigger’s claim, the court cannot permit the individual to proceed in 
court, but rather, the court must compel arbitration of that individual 
employee’s claim.77 Moreover, employees may share common 
substantive questions, such as the number of hours worked and the 
type of work performed, yet require different proceedings to advance 
their claims because the remedy available to one may not be available 
to the other.78 Without a doubt, Bigger’s FLSA claim that her role as a 
CSM should have been eligible for overtime shared many of the same 
substantive questions as all CSM levels 3 and 4; the resolution of 
Bigger’s collective action might prove helpful in the individual 
arbitration outcomes of other CSMs. All the same, the district court 
must recognize that it cannot enforce a claim where the employee has 
consented to submit all claims before a third-party arbitrator, thereby 
waiving a legal right to pursue a resolution in federal district court.79 
 
76 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
77 Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050. 
78 Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 605 F.3d at 449, n.1 (7th Cir. 2010) (“There may 
also be cases where despite common questions as to liability, the remedy is so 
tailored to each particular plaintiff that a collective action is inappropriate.”). 
79 Hoffmann-La Roche Inc, 493 U.S. at 170-71 (“[A]ffirmative permission for 
employees to proceed on behalf of those similarly situated must grant the court the 
requisite procedural authority to manage the process of joining multiple parties in a 
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Put another way, the district court could not authorize court notice to 
all CSMs levels 3 and 4 because it could not grant employees more 
legal rights and enforce an authorization of court notice to individuals 
that were not similarly situated to Bigger. As such, the legal 
distinctions between Bigger and arbitration-bound employees makes 
the Seventh Circuit’s framework fall in line with the goal of 
“enforcement.” 
In all, the Seventh Circuit’s new framework correctly resolves this 
conflict between the FAA and the FLSA. By providing a procedure 
that permits both plaintiff-employees and defendant-employers the 
opportunity to introduce evidence on the existence and validity of 
specific arbitration agreements, the Seventh Circuit streamlines the 
admittance of potential plaintiff-employees. Moreover, addressing the 
threshold question of whether particular arbitration agreements are 
valid and enforceable prior to mailing of court notices mitigates the 
risk of misinforming employees that are mandated to arbitrate their 
employment claims from opting into the collective action. By taking 
steps to ensure that the district court’s authorization of court notice 
addresses which employees waived their legal right to enter the claim, 
the Seventh Circuit directs district courts to become involved early in 
determining the scope of the authorization for collective action notice. 
In all, the Seventh Circuit’s framework maximizes the benefits of the 
prior two-step certification process in that district courts still hold 
discretion in defining the collective while enacting safeguards against 
unchecked propagation of court notice. 
 
manner that is orderly, sensible, and not otherwise contrary to statutory commands 
or the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
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